The rise of international parliamentarism and the consolidation of inter-parliamentary cooperation in the EU
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Since its origins, the European integration process has been based on conventional legal and practical instruments of international law. The same symbols, formats and practices of diplomatic international relations were applied to EU institutions: flags, national delegations, rotating presidencies, essentially meetings in plenary to be convened once or twice per year. The only exceptions were the supranational institutions: the the dialogue between representative assemblies.
In the first decades of European integration, inter-parliamentary dialogue was implicit in the original structure of the European Parliament (EP), composed, at it is well-known, of representatives of national parliaments. Apart from the continuous interaction within the EP, inter-parliamentary relations were mostly carried out bilaterally or through occasional (and rather 'ceremonial') multi-lateral meetings. 
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It is in respect of this evolution that this paper assesses similarities and differences that feature inter-parliamentary cooperation both within and outside the EU. It confirms the influence that the unique nature of the EU's constitutional architecture has exercised on inter-parliamentary relations; and, at the same time, it assumes that the design of EU interparliamentary cooperation has not yet been fully implemented in all its parts, to satisfy the requirements of composite European constitutionalism. Based on this suggestion, the following Sections respectively assess the unique constitutional factors that make interparliamentary cooperation in the EU an essential dimension of the composite European Constitution ( § 2); and analyse how the particular structure of EU parliamentary representation has influenced the organisational and functional arrangement of interparliamentary cooperation in the EU ( § 3). Moving from the formal to the practical perspective, the focus shifts to the limits faced by the most recent EU inter-parliamentary formats, including the post-Lisbon sectoral Conferences; these are compared with the weaknesses experienced by IPIs ( § 4). Finally, the conclusions ( § 5) draw on the causes behind the failure in the full implementation of the European inter-parliamentary experience that do not entirely depend on the persistence of the internationally-oriented design of its formats. The constitutional nature of inter-parliamentary cooperation in the EU is shaped by three quasi-unique factors, respectively dealing with its acting parties, its relationship with the executive branch of government, and its expected impact on the democratic legitimacy of the EU.
The distinctive constitutional factors featuring inter-parliamentary
As for the acting parties, 'cooperation' within the EU involves not only national parliaments, but also the European Parliament, in its capacity as a supranational body Thirdly, on the ground of democratic legitimacy, neither the EP, nor national parliaments, acting alone, are able to hold the EU executive power accountable.
On the one hand, the European Parliament alone cannot provide an acceptable degree of democratic legitimacy to executive decision-making. Notwithstanding the increased competences gradually vested in the EP in the last thirty years, it still lacks the formal powers and tools to hold the executive(s) fully accountable (Crum and Curtin 2015).
On the other hand, European democracy still heavily relies on the legitimacy and democratic resources drawn from national parliaments (Bellamy and Kröger 2014: 437).
The Lisbon Treaty itself recognises (article 10 TEU) the peculiar nature of the European representative democracy founded not exclusively on the EP, but also on the relationship among national governments, national parliaments and national electorates. However, an EU national parliament is no longer in a position to accomplish its own role fully when acting individually on the domestic scene. Uncoincidentally, Article 12 TEU, in listing the 'European powers' of national parliaments, provides that they are called upon to contribute to the 'good functioning' of the Union, acting directly on the EU scene, both individually and through cooperation.
The relationship with the democratic oversight rationale
Due to the insufficiency of either channel of parliamentary representation, interparliamentary cooperation in the EU offers a fertile theoretical ground for legitimising its integral participation in the accountability mechanisms addressing the fragmented EU executive. This is why, compared to the international parliamentary dimension, interparliamentary cooperation in the EU is expected to offer three 'added values'. First, an increase in the level of information dissemination and involvement of (still mainly) national public opinions. Second, the oversight of the fragmented EU executive, which the instruments of inter-parliamentary cooperation should contribute to make more accountable. Third, the building of the precondition for a greater presence of 'political constitutionalism' in the EU (Bellamy 2007).
The first objective is probably the easiest to achieve, as participation in the different inter-parliamentary formats is in itself a way of involving national parliaments and, In a broad perspective, the unique features of the EU's inter-parliamentary arrangement can therefore be appreciated in terms of frequency of meetings, variety of formats involving the same parliaments, capacity to penetrate quite specific sectoral issues, involvement of different components from participating parliaments, interaction with the executive decision-making.
On the limits faced by the post-Lisbon inter-parliamentary conferences: a comparison with IPIs
The sectoral inter-parliamentary conferences established in the post-Lisbon era rely on two apparently opposed assumptions. On the one hand, these conferences are regarded as being among the most advanced formats for inter-parliamentary cooperation that the EU has been able to develop and implement (see infra § 3. 
Conclusions: unresolved ambiguities of the European parliamentary collective dimension
This article argues that inter-parliamentary cooperation in the EU represents a distinctive dimension if compared to transnational dialogue between parliaments. Two main sets of reasons have been discussed in support for this argument. VII The main driving force behind the rise of international parliamentarism lies in the idea that interparliamentary cooperation as a place for debate would turn out to be a 'mitigation' factor, thus contributing to peace-keeping. This 'polemological' rationale did not disappear after the second World War, but reemerged specifically after the end of the Cold War. VIII According to art. 2.1. RoP, the Conference is entitled both to provide a framework for debate and exchange of information and best practices and to 'ensuring democratic accountability in the area of economic governance and budgetary policy in the EU, particularly in the EMU, taking into account the social dimension and without prejudice to the competences of EU Parliaments' (Art. 2.1. RoP). IX See Para 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7 of the Conclusions and, in the Premise, the acknowledgement 'of the need, in respect of the EU CFSP and CSDP, to ensure parliamentary scrutiny of the political and budgetary decisions taken at national and European level'. X In some of the IPI classifications available, the supervisory function is adopted as one of the leading criteria. Specifically, Cutler, 2011, 30 f distinguishes between: congresses (occasional meetings without permanent secretariat); assemblies (regular meetings with limited secretariat or informal organisation); parliaments (a permanent body based on an institutionalised secretariat that undertakes rule-supervisory activities); legislatures (a permanent body with an institutionalised organisation that not only undertakes a variety of programmatic activities arising from rule creation and supervision but also proposes laws for adoption by member states). XI Fasone 2009: 160 ff. distinguishes among two distinct forms of inter-parliamentary cooperation: the permanent forms of cooperation, summoned on regular basis, as in the case of the Conference of the Speakers and COSAC; the incidental forms of cooperation, promoted una tantum. XII A classification according to the stages of institutional development is followed by Cutler 2011: 30.
